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Abstract
This paper discusses the merits and limits of the recent European energy policy aimed at reducing
carbon emissions, devoting particular attention to the European Trading System of carbon permits
and to the measures that the European Union has adopted to promote renewable energy sources.
From the comparison of past goals and present results, it is argued that more credible targets for
carbon emission reductions and renewable shares would probably help the transition towards an
alternative energy system and the necessary reduction of greenhouse gases.
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1. Introduction

The current system of energy production and consumption is largely based on the use of
Fossil Fuels (FF) that account for 80.3 per cent of the world total energy supply. As it is well
known, however, these energy sources have two main drawbacks as they are both exhaustible and
polluting. Both aspects are the object of a heated debate in the literature, but while experts disagree
on the scarcity of fossil fuels and estimates of their amount deeply differ across different studies,
scholars largely agree on the fact that FF contribute to climate change through an increase in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In the 15 original member States of the European Union (EU-15)
energy production accounts for 59 per cent of GHGs and this share rises up to 80 per cent of total
GHG emissions if all the 27 EU member States are taken into account (European Environment
Agency, 2009). These considerations call for a shift towards a different energy system that is less
dependent on FF in the future, especially in the EU that import most of these resources from outside
and is thus particularly vulnerable to the extreme price volatility of the oil and gas markets.
However, opinions deeply diverge on the urgency and on the optimal timing of the transition
process.
The object of this paper is to examine the climate and energy policies that the EU has
implemented in the last few years, in order to evaluate the role that the EU has played so far and
may/should play in the future in leading this transition process.
For this purpose, the structure of the paper will be as follows. Section 2 examines the main
measures adopted by the EU to reduce carbon emissions. Section 3 focuses attention on a few
possible shortcomings of the European Emission Trading Scheme introduced after 2003. Section 4
analyzes the EU renewable energy policies and discusses the speed that the transition to an
alternative energy system has had in Europe so far. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks on
the importance of setting credible targets in the future for the success of the EU energy policies that
emerges from the comparison between past goals and present results.
2
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2. The EU climate policies

In the last decade, the EU has played a leading role in promoting and implementing an
international agreement to reduce climate change. As is well known, following the ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol on 31 May 2002, the EU-15 committed to an overall CO2 emissions reduction
target of 8 per cent by 2008-’12 with respect to the 1990 levels, allowing different national
emissions target within the EU to account for the different economic and environmental conditions
of its member countries in the benchmark year 1990.2 Although many experts evaluated the Kyoto
Protocol commitments as just a first step in the right direction and certainly insufficient to stop
global warming, most member states and the EU overall, however, found it difficult to achieve even
the target set by the Kyoto Protocol. This clearly emerges from figure 1 that reports the distance
from the Kyoto goal of the EU-15 and its members in 2008.3 The negative values in the figure
indicate the over-achievement by 2008 of those “virtuous” countries (about one third of the EU-15
members) that managed to go beyond their target, reducing CO2 emissions more than initially
required by the Kyoto Protocol, while the positive values show what we can call “the Kyoto gap”,
namely, the current distance from the Kyoto target characterizing the other countries and the overall
EU-15. While Italy, for instance, had committed to cut CO2 emissions by 6.5% with respect to the
1990 according to the Kyoto Protocol, such emissions did not decrease and actually further
increased in the meantime by 4.7% thus enlarging the gap from the Kyoto goal up to 11.2% in
2008.
2

The ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 as well as Romania and Bulgaria (that entered
the EU in 2007) will have to take part in the overall EU emission reduction of 20 per cent by 2020
that is planned for the post-Kyoto phase in the period 2013-2020 (see discussion below). If we
exclude Malta and Cipro, however, all the new member countries were already among the Annex I
Parties of the Kyoto Protocol, therefore they had previously committed to different emissions limits
under the Protocol.
3
The values shown in the diagram indicate the percentage deviation of actual emissions in
2008 from a (hypothetical) linear path between the base-year (1990) emissions level and the target
for 2010, thus measuring the current progress towards the Kyoto target.
3
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According to the latest available data released by the European Environment Agency (2009),
however, EU emissions have steadily declined in the last few years due to warmer weather
conditions and more expensive fuels. This has led some experts to claim that the EU has already
achieved the 8 per cent emissions reduction required by the Kyoto Protocol. As a matter of fact, the
overall EU-27 GHG emissions were estimated to be 7.7 per cent below the 1990 levels in 2006 and
11.3 per cent below that benchmark year in 2008 (European Environment Agency, 2010a), so that
the Kyoto target would have been actually overcome.4
These encouraging results, however, should be interpreted with much caution for at least
two reasons. In the first place, the estimated emissions reductions are likely to reflect the recent
worldwide economic recession that has significantly reduced industrial production and the related
emissions level. In the second place, the overall EU emissions reductions have been mainly driven
by the EU enlargement to the Eastern European countries that have experienced a dramatic decline
of their production with respect to the 1990 levels. From a closer look at the data, in fact, it emerges
that in the new member States GHG emissions have decreased by 26.7 per cent between 1990 and
2008, whereas in the EU-15 emissions have fallen by only 6.5 per cent in the same period
(European Environment Agency, 2010a). The 8 per cent target, however, was valid for the 15
member States that preceded the EU enlargement. In our opinion, therefore, it is at this group of
countries (rather than at the enlarged EU) that one should look at to evaluate the European
performance with respect to the Kyoto target.5

At the moment of going to press, new estimations for 2009 are released by the European
Environment Agency (2010b). According to this report, the EU-27 GHG emissions in 2009 were
6.9% below the 2008 level, thus leading to an overall GHG emissions reduction of 17.3% with
respect to the 1990 level.
5
On the basis of the preliminary data just released for 2009 (European Environment Agency,
2010b) in the EU-15 emissions have dramatically fell in 2009 due to the recent economic crisis, so
that the average emissions for 2008 and 2009 were 2.2% below the EU-15 emission targets. Notice,
however, that estimates of the 2009 GHG emissions are currently available for only 7 of the EU-15
members. Moreover, as explicitly pointed out by the European Environment Agency (2010b, p.6),
the possible over-achievement of the emissions reductions at the EU-15 level “relies on the
assumption — which cannot be taken for granted — that certain Member States will exceed their
target and cover any shortfall in other Member States”.
4

4
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The current debate on the best policy instruments to reach the Kyoto target requires a deeper
analysis of the EU directives and energy policies that have been implemented so far to achieve the
required emissions cut, since the European experience may provide valuable lessons also for other
countries in the post-Kyoto phase and as a proto-type for a global GHG emissions trading regime
(Ellerman, 2008). In this regard, since the beginning of the century the EU has adopted two Climate
Change Programmes (2000 and 2005) and three important directives that deserve particular
attention: the Directive 2003/87/EC (“Emission Trading”), the Directive 2004/101/EC (“Linking”)
and, more recently, the Directive 2009/29/EC that improves and completes the other two. The
Emission Trading Directive 2003/87/EC introduced also in Europe carbon emission permits, a
market instrument that had been already used with some success in the US. As is well known, the
aim of this instrument is to create a market and an artificial price for the pollution of public
environmental goods (such as the atmosphere) that can otherwise be used for free. The creation of a
market price generates an incentive to adopt a more environmental friendly technology to avoid the
cost of purchasing the permits. The EU Directive allowed each member State to establish a national
emission scheme to determine the initial allocation criteria of emission permits and the share
allocated to selected sectors in two trading phases (2005-’07 and 2008-’12).6 Once the emission
permits are allocated by single countries, their trading is allowed within the EU, so that a firm in a
given European country that needs for its activities more permits than those at its disposal can
purchase them from a firm in another country that has permits in excess of its needs and intends to
sell them. The EU Directive (art.16), moreover, established penalties equal to 40€ (in the first
trading phase: 2005-2007) and 100€ (in the second phase: 2008-2012) per tonne of CO2 emitted in
excess of the allowances at disposal.
The Emission Trading Directive has been subsequently modified by the so-called “Linking”
Directive (2004/101/EC) that allowed for the use in the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-

The sectors indicated by the Directive were: energy activities (for example oil refineries);
production and processing of ferrous metals; mineral industry; pulp and paper industry.
6

5
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ETS) of emission credits deriving from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint
Implementation (JI) projects. In other words, the emission credits obtained by reducing emissions
outside the EU can be transformed into emissions permits to be used within the EU-ETS, thus
“linking” the latter system to the CDM and JI projects (which explains the name of the Directive).
Finally, in April 2009 the new Directive 2009/29/EC entered into force that substantially
reforms the EU-ETS to overcome the application problems that emerged in the first few years of its
functioning. In the next section we will examine some of these problems and the revisions of the
EU-ETS that have been recently implemented to get over them.

3. The European Emission Trading Scheme: open issues

The introduction in the EU of an ETS and its subsequent connection to worldwide
implementation projects represents an important change in the European energy policy towards the
more intensive use of market-based policy instruments. This change goes in the direction of the US
energy policy that has traditionally been more market-oriented than the European one, thus
incidentally reducing the conflict between the opposite viewpoints of the EU and the US on how to
implement the Kyoto Protocol or a possible follow-up, although many other problems remain to be
solved before achieving a new international agreement in this field, as it clearly emerged from the
last Conference of the Parties (COP-15) in Copenhagen. However, it is possible to identify several
open issues that may adversely affect the functioning of the EU-ETS.7 The first problem concerns
the allocation criteria that have been used so far. As a matter of fact, emission permits have been
given mainly for free on the basis of the firms’ historical emission levels using a grandfathering
allocation system. This criterion, however, tends to preserve the status quo, reducing the firms’
incentive to adopt more environmental friendly technologies. Moreover, it may create potential
The performance of the EU-ETS is the object of increasing attention among scholars. See,
among the others, the recent contributions on this issue by Ellerman and Buchner (2007), Convery
and Redmond (2007), Krueger et al. (2007), Bredin and Muckley (2010) and Kettner et al. (2010).

7
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disparities in the permits market between large firms (that receive many initial permits to maintain
their activity level) and small-medium enterprises. For these reasons, it may be preferable to adopt
an auction system as initial allocation criterion.8 Whether carbon permits are given away for free or
sold by the government through an auction system, this will not affect the market-clearing price that
emerges in a competitive market.9 The two allocation methods, however, can have very different
distributional effects according to how the auction revenues are used and whom the permits are
grandfathered. In a grandfathering system scarcity rents go to the recipient of permits, while in an
auction system the government collects these rents as revenues that can be used to reduce the deficit
and/or cut distortionary taxes. Therefore, while the method of allocation of carbon permits does not
affect their price (since it influences neither their demand nor their supply), it will determine who is
going to pocket the extra revenues, whether potential emitters or taxpayers10. Moreover, the
government entries generated by the auction system could be used to promote R&D in
environmental innovation and the diffusion of better technologies, with a potential double-dividend
effect in terms of higher economic growth and lower environmental damages.11 Finally, as some
authors have argued (cf. Cramton and Kerr, 2002), another attractive feature of an auction system is
that it may entail lower administrative costs and lower delays in the implementation with respect to
8

Several contributions seem to support this argument. Some authors (Parry et al., 1998), for
instance, estimate that the reduction cost of air emissions in the case of grandfathering is three times
higher than with an auction system. Grubb and Neuhoff (2006), moreover, point out that the
maximum use of allowed auctioning would improve efficiency without precluding most
participating sectors from profiting from the EU-ETS. Mandell (2005) argues that the auctioning of
allowances is to be preferred to their allocation for free and compares the effects of alternative
frequencies of carbon permit auctions. See also Demailly and Quirion (2008) for a partial
equilibrium analysis of the impact on competitiveness and economic efficiency of alternative
allocation rules in the EU-ETS.
9
As a matter of fact, for the potential emitter what matters is the opportunity cost of using the
permit, whether received for free or through an auction, that is given by the loss of the opportunity
to sell that allowance in the future.
10
See Ellerman and Joskov (2008) for a further discussion of the controversial issue of
“windfall profits” for incumbents, namely, additional profits earned by potential emitters to which
allowances were allocated for free. See also Pearson (2010) for a detailed analysis of the profits that
the main companies may have derived from the free allocation of the allowances in the EU-ETS.
11
See Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) for an analysis of the literature on the “double
dividend” hypothesis, the possible uses of auction revenues and the relative performance of various
policy instruments in a second best context.
7
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grandfathering. The latter system, in fact, often implies long negotiations between the government
and the interest groups that invest much time and resources in lobbying activities in order to obtain
the highest possible number of initial permits.
Despite the potential benefits of an auction system with respect to a grandfathering system,
the final design of the EU-ETS has been heavily influenced by the existence of powerful interest
groups in the sectors regulated by the ETS that have hindered so far the adoption of auctioning as
initial allocation rule (see Cramton and Kerr, 2002, and Markussen and Svendson, 2005). The
European Commission had originally proposed a huge increase in auctioning as early as 2013, with
full auctioning becoming the rule from 2013 onwards for the power sector and between 2013 and
2020 for the other sectors. But the fierce opposition of the dominant interest groups of the regulated
sectors has induced the Commission to postpone the deadline for the complete phase out of the free
allocation system in the final text of the Directive, that requires the level of auctioning to achieve
70% of all allocations in 2020 and 100% in 2027.12
A second problem that emerged in the initial phases of application of the EU-ETS concerns
possible inconsistencies between this system and the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of the
emission permits. During the first trading phase (2005-’07), most NAPs allocated a number of
emission permits that was inconsistent with the Kyoto target, going well above the upper bound
originally established for each member state by the Kyoto Protocol (Gilbert et al., 2004; Sijm,
2005). The over-allocation of allowances by the NAPs was largely responsible for the sharp fall in
the spot price of the emissions permits observed during the first period. A similar over-allocation
occurred also in the second phase, when the European Commission had to intervene on 11 of the 12
original NAPs proposals (with the only exception of the UK), reducing the total number of emission
permits that were originally allowed by each state.

Some energy-intensive sectors, however, could continue to receive their emission permits
for free if they are considered to be at risk of “carbon leakage”, namely, if their firms might decide
to relocate their activities in countries with less restrictive environmental policies.

12
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The creation of too many allowances by member states was mainly due to political pressure
on the governments from interest groups who wanted to receive more permits. However, defining a
binding cap turned out to be difficult for most member states also because there was strong
uncertainty on the actual emissions level that had to provide the baseline data to set the cap and
because “installation data had to be assembled in great haste to meet the tight implementation
deadlines” (Ellerman and Joskov, 2008, p.32). The over-allocation of allowances to emitters and its
price consequences have largely contributed to the recent decision to abolish the NAPs in the next
trading phase (2013-2020), replacing the decentralized structure of the EU-ETS with a centralized
cap-setting process.13
Empirical evidence suggests a third problematic aspect that arises with the application of the
EU-ETS, namely, the extreme market price volatility. As a matter of fact, the price of CO2 emission
permits tripled in the period January-July 2005, then more than halved in just one week during
April 2006 (when new data were released reporting emissions levels substantially lower than
expected) and subsequently declined to zero over the next year (see figure 2). Several reasons may
have contributed to the price volatility observed in that period (Ellerman and Joskov, 2008). In the
first place, the verified emissions data were released relatively late, leaving participants little time at
disposal to adjust their expectations to the new information. In the second place, restrictions on
banking between the first and the second trading phases prevented arbitrage from reducing the price
difference between the first and the second period allowances.14 Therefore, it may be argued that
the dramatic price volatility described above was mainly due to the price discovery on a new market
and to the mistakes initially done by policy-makers in the trial period, that was intended to provide
a sort of learning phase for a successful use of the ETS in the following periods. Extreme price
See D'Amato and Valentini (2008) and Ellerman and Buchner (2008) for an analysis of the
consequences of a decentralized EU-ETS versus a centralized one.
14
Such allowances were treated as two different products because of the absence of banking
from the first to the second period. See Ellerman and Joskov (2008, Fig.1, p.13) for the evolution of
the price gap between the first and second period allowances. Inter-period banking, however, will
be allowed for the second and following trading periods, thus avoiding this major flaws that
occurred in the design of the trial period.
13

9
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volatility, however, is not always limited to the initial phases of cap-and-trade systems. This is
clearly shown, for instance, by the extreme price fluctuations of the sulphur dioxide allowances that
occurred in the US between 2004 and 2006, long after the start-up of that programme (that was
introduced in 1993), as well as by the recent evolution of the price of the carbon permits in the EUETS that more than halved in a few months (from above 27 €/tonne in June 2008 to 13.25€/tonne as
of 15 January 2009). In December 2009, moreover, the carbon price showed high volatility in the
EU market reflecting rapidly changing expectations on the stringency of the future environmental
policies. The price of EU allowances, in fact, rose by nearly 3 per cent ahead of the COP-15 since
agents expected an international agreement on more stringent emissions reductions to be reached in
Copenhagen, and then dropped by 8.7 per cent to a 6-months low immediately after the conference
failure to achieve a legally binding treaty on emissions cut. This explains the existing concern for
further price fluctuations in the EU-ETS in the future. High market instability, in fact, generates
uncertainty among the agents that may discourage their investments in more environmental friendly
technologies. If the agents expect that the price of carbon permits may suddenly decline in the
future, they will prefer to keep on using the old polluting technology rather than shift to a new, less
polluting but more expensive technology.
Finally, as far as the penalty system is concerned, art.16 of the Emission Trading Directive
described above establishes that if an operator emits more than allowed by the permits at disposal, it
will be liable not only to pay the penalty, but also to purchase the excess emissions “when
surrendering allowances in relation to the following calendar year”. This suggests that the price that
the non-compliant firm has to pay for its excess emissions is given by the market price when the
purchase is made. It follows that the large fluctuations of the market price observed above, together
with possible limitations in the monitoring system, might generate moral hazard behaviours among
the operators. For instance, if the price of the permits in the following period and/or the ability of
the national authority to monitor non-compliant behaviours are/is expected to be sufficiently low,

10
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then the operator might have an incentive to “cheat” (i.e. surrender less allowances than its actual
emissions) and pollute in excess of the allowances at disposal.
This point can be illustrated in heuristic terms through a simple analytical framework.15
Consider an operator that has to decide at time 0 whether to buy the x permits for the emissions in
excess of the allowances at disposal.16 Let us indicate with pt the price of the permits that prevails
on the market at time t. If the operator purchases at time 0 all the additional permits it will
obviously pay:
(1) p0x
If, on the contrary, the operator decides not to purchase the additional permits that would be
necessary to cover its excess emissions, then the expected cost will be:
(2) δ[Fx+p1x]
where 0≤δ≤1 is the probability to be “discovered” by the national authority, F is the penalty
for each tonne of emissions x in excess of the allowances at disposal and p1 is the present
discounted value of the expected price of the permits in the next period that the operator will have
to pay for the additional allowances if “discovered” by the national regulator.
From (1) and (2) it follows that if:
(3) p0 > δ[F+p1]
the operator will prefer to cheat and run the risk of being discovered rather than buy all the
necessary permits today. As claimed above, therefore, the lower are δ and/or p1, the higher the
As it is well known, the heuristic method provides a simplified analysis of the phenomenon
that lies in between a purely intuitive explanation of the problem and an exhaustive theoretical
model. The illustration proposed here is kept deliberately simple to focus the attention of the reader
on a few basic logical passages that allow to support the main statement that the observed price
volatility may induce moral hazard behaviours. The following passages, therefore, should be
interpreted as just a first step in the direction of a thorough analytical model. See Carmona et al.
(2009) for an analysis of the equilibrium price dynamics of the emission permits that takes the
penalty level into account. See also Grull and Taschini (2009) for an investigation of the main
design mechanisms proposed by policy makers to keep the permit price from rising or falling too
much.
16
We assume for the sake of simplicity that the operator has to purchase one permit for each
tonne of emissions, so that the variable x indicates both the number of permits to be purchased and
the tonnes of pollutant emitted by the operator.
15

11
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probability that the operator may decide to cheat. From (3) it follows that the penalty system
indirectly introduces a price-ceiling in the market since if the current price p0 is sufficiently high
(above the right-hand side of (3)), then the agents will have an incentive not to “cover” all their
emissions.
To avoid moral hazard behaviours, the regulator should obviously improve its monitoring
system as much as possible. But even if δ=1 (operators have no chance to “escape” the penalty if
they try to cheat), agents might still prefer not to purchase all necessary permits if:
(4) p0 > F+p1
To avoid this risk the penalty can obviously be increased as the price of carbon permits
rises.17 However, one can find opposite reasons that lead to keep the penalty constant and thus
introduce a price ceiling in the market. In the first place, if the penalty becomes very high, it might
also loose its credibility and thus generate time consistency problems. As a matter of fact, if the
penalty becomes extremely high, the firms may reasonably expect that the fee will not be applied as
this would cause non-compliant firms to close up and thus increase unemployment in the country,
generating high social costs that the local authority may not be willing to face. In the second place,
if we let the penalty grow with the carbon price, then a similar non-compliant behaviour would be
punished more or less heavily depending on the price fluctuations, what may raise doubts on the
equity of the sanction. Finally, a price ceiling might provide a useful “safety net” against possible
mistakes by policy-makers. The latter, in fact, often lack sufficient information on the firms’
abatement costs when establishing the emission cap. A price ceiling, therefore, may prevent
abatement costs from rising above what is socially optimal and in this sense a penalty system might
be a useful instrument against upward price fluctuations. If so, however, it would be reasonable to
introduce in the market also a lower bound for the carbon price to prevent that possible flaws in the
policy design (such as a too high emissions cap) may reduce the carbon price below what is socially
17

For instance, the penalty could be set above the carbon price by a given percentage r, i.e.:
F=p0(1+r). This would allow the penalty to move along with the carbon price, ensuring that the
former lies always above the latter so that condition (4) does not hold.
12
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optimal. Stated differently, if one accepts the idea that some form of market regulation would be
desirable to correct the possible inefficiency of a cap-and-trade system, then we might consider to
set not only a ceiling but also a floor on the carbon price that prevent potential polluters from
paying too much (too little, respectively), that is, more (less) than socially optimal.
The problems that affect the application of the Emission Trading Directive 2003/87/EC have
recently led to a substantial revision of the EU-ETS. In particular, the new Directive 2009/29/EC
has introduced the following three main changes: (i) the extension of the EU-ETS to further
industries (for example, the petrochemical, aluminium and ammonia sectors) and gases (nitrous
oxide and perfluorocarbons), (ii) a unique EU emission permits ceiling (rather than 27 different
national ceilings) that decreases every year during the third trading phase (2013-2020), (iii) higher
share of emissions allocated through auctions rather than grandfathering, along with the
harmonization of the allocation rules when permits are instead given for free.
All these proposals seem rather desirable. The extension of the ETS can produce a thicker
market of carbon permits, thus reducing the potential lack of transactions and of competition that
constitutes one of the main application problems reported in the literature on tradable permits (cf.
Hahn 1984, Hagem and Westkog, 1998). As to the harmonization of the emission permits ceilings
and the allocation rules, this may help to reduce the consistency problems described above that may
occur between the EU energy policy and the one pursued by single member States. In this direction
seems to go the Directive on energy taxation (2003/96/EC) that sets a minimal taxation level on
electricity and energy products in all member States. Finally, also the adoption of an auction rather
than grandfathering as allocation criterion may improve the functioning of the ETS. In this case,
however, particular attention should be devoted to the design of the auction as this may play a
crucial role for the success of the system (Cramton and Kerr, 2002). As a matter of fact, if the
auction is not properly designed it may favour a few large firms that initially buy most of the
permits for strategic reasons. This problem is certainly more likely to occur in small, local markets
rather than in the EU-ETS for carbon emissions that covers thousands of firms across different
13
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sectors. However, market concentration and the potential abuse of market power may arise even in
similar contexts with many firms, as it emerges from the experience of the UK ETS, the world’s
first large-scale GHG trading scheme that was launched in April 2002. In the UK ETS, although the
number of participants was very high (approximately 1400 firms in over 40 industrial sectors the
first 3 years), sales were very concentrated, with the four largest sellers accounting for 65.7 per cent
of total sales (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). Interestingly enough, all four largest sellers entered
the UK ETS as a result of an auction in 2002 which allocated a budget for abatement subsidies.18
According to Smith and Swierzbinski (2007), the observed concentration on the permits supply side
is likely to reflect the concentration in the auction outcome where some firms might have
coordinated their behaviour to manipulate the auction price. The UK experience, therefore, may
provide important insights for the EU-wide carbon trading scheme, suggesting that the issue of
market concentration should not be neglected in the auction design even in the EU-ETS despite the
large number of potential participants.

4. The EU renewable energy policies

The other main route beyond the ETS that the EU has followed so far to come closer to the
Kyoto targets is given by the progressive shift of the energy system towards renewable sources.
While the ETS can be interpreted as an application of the “polluter pays principle” (which does not
exclude pollution but aims at internalizing its negative effects), the increasing attention to
renewables moves in the direction of an alternative zero-emissions energy model.
It can be argued (cf. Kolev and Riess, 2009) that the promotion of renewables and energy
efficiency can contribute to reduce emissions if they are applied to sectors not covered by the ETS
scheme, but may fail to do so if applied to the ETS sectors. In fact, if the supply of emission permits

See Smith and Swierzbinski (2007) for a detailed description of the functioning of the UK
ETS and its results.

18
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is kept constant at a given carbon emissions level, supporting these policies in the ETS sectors
might end up simply decreasing the demand of the emission permits and thus their price without
generating additional emissions cut. If so, the renewable energy policies set forth in the ETS sectors
should be seen as a substitute rather than as a complement to the ETS. However, the reduction in
the demand of emission permits induced by the promotion of renewables in the ETS sectors can be
counterbalanced by a progressive reduction in the supply of permits from the regulatory authority
aimed at reducing emissions over time.19
The steps of the transition towards an alternative energy model have been determined by
three main Directives: the Directive 2001/77/EC on renewables, the 2003/30/EC on biofuels, and
the recent Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of energy use from renewable sources that
modifies and repeals the two previous Directives. The first Directive established that renewable
energy sources (solar, wind, biomass, geothermal and so on) should have increased up to 21 per
cent of electricity consumption and 12 per cent of all consumption by 2010. In 2005, however, the
share of renewables on electricity and energy consumption was still 15 per cent and 6.38 per cent,
respectively, so that the original target is unlikely to be reached. A similar argument applies to the
Directive on biofuels20 (2003/30/EC) whose past target for the year 2005 (biofuels growing up to 2
per cent of total transport fuels by 2005) was largely missed (only 1 per cent being reached in the
EU-25 by that year) and the current target for the year 2010 (5,75 per cent of total transport fuels)
seems rather unlikely to be achieved (see figure 3).21
The European Commission’s Communication “Limiting global climate change to 2 degrees
Celsius. The way ahead for 2020 and beyond” looks even more ambitious than the Directives

A progressive reduction of the EU-wide cap might actually occur in the future given the
long-term EU goal of cutting CO2 emissions by 50 per cent by 2050, though at the moment there
are no formal commitments to such a reduction.
20
As it is well known, by this term we mean any fuel from biomass, such as bioethanol,
biodiesel and biogas.
21
This is also due to the negative side effects that biofuels have recently provoked on the food
market that are the object of a heated debate among experts and policy-makers. We will omit the
analysis of this issue here as it goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
19
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mentioned above. As it is well known, this Communication (published on 10 January 2007, and
subsequently approved by the EU Council, on March 8-9, 2007) establishes the EU unilateral
commitment to cut GHG emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 with respect to 1990 (or by 30 per cent
if a global agreement on climate change will be reached). Moreover, the EU commits to increase
energy savings by 20 per cent by the year 2020 and to raise by the same year the share of
renewables on total energy supply up to 20 per cent. To achieve these targets, in April 2009 the EU
has adopted a new Directive on renewables (2009/28/EC) that sets individual targets for each
member state for 2020 accounting for their different per capita GDP levels, as well as intermediate
targets (the so called “indicative trajectories”) to be reached during the progress towards the 2020
targets.22 According to the new Directive, each country is free to choose its preferred “mix” of
renewables to meet its target. All member states, moreover, are required to present National
Renewable Energy Action Plans and progress reports every two years to evaluate their effective
advancement towards the 2020 targets.
The new legislative framework adopted by the EU, commonly named the “20-20-20 plan”,
is certainly attractive as it conveys a clear goal that can easily catch the attention of public opinion
and the mass-media. But the question that should be asked is whether and to what extent this
commitment is reliable. If one looks at the unsuccessful attempts to achieve less ambitious
environmental targets in the past, we are inclined to believe that a fortiori this more stringent goal
might be missed in the future, especially because the “20-20-20” plan deals with a near future. The
more so, since the current global financial crisis might lead the EU to postpone intervention, giving
lower priority to the environmental issues in the next few years. This consideration does not deny
the important step forwards that the EU has done in these years in developing renewable energy
sources. As a matter of fact, the electricity production from renewable sources has rapidly increased
in Europe from the 1990s onwards. And the EU currently plays the role of world leader in several
More precisely, the Directive sets the following intermediate targets: 20% of the final target
to be reached between 2011 and 2012, 30% between 2013 and 2014, 45% between 2015 and 2016
and 65% between 2017 and 2018.
22
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renewable energy markets such as the wind power market in which 60 per cent of all firms are
European ones. However, the share of primary energy supply from renewable resources increased
very slowly in the EU countries that are member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, passing from 6.8 per cent in 1990 to 7.6 per cent in 2003, and is expected to remain
well below 10 per cent in 2010.
The speed of the transition process from exhaustible to renewable resources is obviously
affected by the price gap between them. It is generally argued that a more rapid transition to
renewable resources has not occurred so far since the cost of producing energy from exhaustible
resources is well below the correspondent cost from most renewable resources. Thus, for instance, a
study carried out by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2005a) on more than 130 power plants
in several countries finds that the lowest cost of generating electricity from traditional (coal-fired
and gas-fired) power plants ranges between 25 and 45 United States dollars (US$) per megawatthour (MWh), whereas the correspondent cost is about 150 US$/MWh for solar plants.23
This argument would be perfectly sound if the market price could signal the true scarcity of
the resources. In reality, however, the market price signal may be distorted by several factors
(Borghesi, 2008; Borghesi and Vercelli, 2008). In the first place, it does not take into account the
oligopolistic nature of FF markets (especially in the case of oil and natural gas). In the second place,
the market price does not account for the negative externalities deriving from the production and
consumption of FF. If this was the case, the market price of FF should be much higher than it is
today and one cannot exclude that in this case renewable resources could already be competitive
with the exhaustible resources so that the transition process should be much accelerated. Finally,
The estimated costs, however, differ substantially across different studies according to the
underlying assumptions on the discount rate, the projected prices of exhaustible and renewable
resources, and the size and economic lifetime of the power plants taken into account. According to
the IEA (2005b), for instance, the cost of generating electricity from photovoltaics ranges between
200 and 400 US$ per MWh, while the correspondent cost ranges between 431,4 and 508 US$
according to the World Bank (2005). Also notice that, if we exclude photovoltaics, others
renewables are already competitive with most fossil fuel based power plants. For instance, the
estimated cost of producing energy is about 30-40 US$/MWh for large hydro power plants and
about 40-60 for wind generating technologies (IEA, 2005b).

23
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most government subsidies are still mainly directed to FF rather than to renewable resources,
although more attention has been devoted to subsidising renewable resources in the last few years.
If the energy subsidies were progressively shifted from exhaustible to renewable resources, this
might contribute to increase the price of the exhaustible resources and simultaneously decrease that
of the renewable resources, thus potentially reducing the current price gap that induce to postpone
the transition towards renewable resources.24
The above mentioned distortions in the market price signal might have slowed down so far
the transition to an alternative energy system. The speed of this transition process, however, is not
the same within Europe but shows large differences across the EU countries. In the case of
photovoltaics, for instance, almost 90 per cent of the whole production capacity installed in the EU
in the year 2006 occurred in only one country (Germany). Surprisingly enough, very sunny
countries such as Spain, Italy and especially Greece lag much behind in the investments specifically
devoted to this renewable resource. Similarly, the share of biofuels over total transport fuels show
huge differences in Europe where Germany plays again the role of market leader and is the only
European country that managed to go beyond its national target.
These considerations call for both an acceleration and an harmonization of the transition
process towards renewable resources. In this regard, the new Directive 2009/28/EC seems to go in
the right direction as it adopts binding targets for 2020 for single member States and harmonizes the
national standard and certificate systems. The new normative framework, moreover, addresses
explicitly the heating and cooling sectors, as well as the transport sector that account, respectively,
for about 50 per cent and 31.5 per cent of the energy final consumption in the EU-27 (European
Environment Agency, 2009). In our opinion, however, much remains to be done. In particular, the
normative framework should be reinforced, introducing financial penalties based on strict criteria -

An increase in the subsidies to renewable energy sources, however, may also raise their
demand and thus lead to an increase rather than a decrease in their price level. This is what might
actually be occurring in the case of biofuels whose price has recently increased with negative side
effects on the food price.
24
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rather than the generic threat of legal action that remains at the Commission's discretion- for those
countries that fail to reach the intermediate targets. Moreover, in order to speed up the transition
towards alternative energy sources it would be of crucial importance to reduce the uncertainty on
the reiteration of the renewable energy policies by member States. In fact, at the national level the
environmental and energy priorities have shown to be very sensitive to the prevailing political
orientation. As a consequence, government changes can result in abrupt policy changes in the
promotion of renewable energies that may discourage the agents from investing in this field.

5. Concluding remarks: credible goals for “incredible” results

The current global warming process poses serious problems not only for its biophysical
effects, but also for its potentially vast economic consequences. A more rapid transition from the
current fossil fuel economy towards an alternative energy system seems highly desirable to set free
from the unavoidable future scarcity and the current pollution problems that come along with the
use of fossil fuels. In the case of Europe, moreover, shifting to a different energy model could
provide the additional large benefit of reducing the present EU dependency on costly energy
imports and the vulnerability of energy supply that often comes from politically unstable world
regions (such as OPEC countries in the case of oil, or Russia and Iran for gas imports). This aspect
may explain the increasing efforts of the EU in developing alternative, pollution-free energy sources
and the leading role that the EU has played at the world level in the endeavour to reduce CO2
emissions. Despite these efforts, however, much remains to be done to increase the role and
improve the performance of the renewable energy sources, as well as to achieve the minimal CO2
reduction requirements that would be needed to slow down the ongoing global warming process.
As to the CO2 emissions reductions, the creation of a European ETS is probably the most
important change in the EU energy policy after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Although this
system can potentially increase emissions abatement, its design and functioning should still be
19
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improved in many respects. In particular, a well-design auction system for the initial allocation of
carbon permits might perform better than the grandfathering system mainly adopted so far that
tends to preserve the existing situation and may generate entry-barriers to new competitors.
Moreover, the National Allocation Plans should be fully consistent with the EU-ETS to reinforce
the credibility of the European CO2 reduction efforts. In addition, the large price volatility observed
in the EU-ETS market represents a further problematic aspect in the functioning of the system since
it tends to increase the operators’ uncertainty and may thus discourage investments in new
environmental friendly technologies. Finally, as argued in the paper, the present constant penalty
system might potentially generate moral hazard behaviours. Although at the moment this is
admittedly a minor problem (since the fee is currently much above the market price), to avoid this
risk it might be preferable to let the penalty move along with the carbon price rather than keep it
constant over time.
Even in the case of the renewable policies, despite the leading role played by the EU in this
field, there remains much scope for further improvements. Although the goals in terms of carbon
emissions reduction and renewable energies were often missed (or, at best, hardly achieved) so far
and some of them are likely to be missed by the end of the reference period, the “20-20-20” EU
plan established even more ambitious targets to be reached by 2020. This policy that keeps on
raising up the target and postponing the deadline, however, is hardly credible. It looks pretty much
like the behaviour of a jumper in a pole-vault competition that keeps on raising up the height of the
pole aiming at the world record although she misses even the first attempts at lower levels. This
(hopefully wrong) impression is somehow reinforced by the recent proposals at the last G8 meeting
in Hokkaido (Japan) and at the COP-15 in Copenhagen that aim at halving carbon emissions by
2050. This long-run objective that was originally proposed by the European Commission (2007) is
certainly of crucial importance to prevent the massive disruption of the global climate system. But it
looks again as an even more ambitious target that is further postponed in time, the achievement of
which appears rather unlikely at present given the difficulty of the EU-15 to reach the much easier
20
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goal set by the Kyoto target (that was largely met only via the current crisis) and the failure of
international negotiations to achieve a binding treaty for the post-Kyoto period. This international
energy policy seems to recall similar very ambitious targets recently set by the United Nations’
Millennium Development Goals (like, for instance, halving extreme poverty and the proportion of
people who suffer from hunger by 2015) that are provoking some critiques for the extreme
difficulty in achieving or even –in some case- getting close to the desired result.
The inability to achieve intermediate results may pose serious time inconsistency and
credibility problems that are well-known and well-described in other areas of the economic
literature such as monetary economics (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983). The
attempt to avoid these problems have also guided the European monetary policy and its effort to
“tight her own hands” underlying the Stability and Growth Pact. The recent difficulties to achieve
the monetary goals and the consequent revision proposals of the Stability Pact should induce the EU
to adopt feasible goals even for its energy policy in the future. Otherwise, credibility problems
might hinder its capacity to reach concrete results. For instance, if agents believe the EU energy and
emission targets will not be seriously pursued, they could decide not to buy carbon permits since
they may expect that a legally binding international treaty will not be reached in the near future, that
the authority will not be able to monitor polluting emissions or that the penalty system will not be
applied. If so, the demand and the price of carbon permits in the EU-ETS might decrease to very
low levels as it recently occurred after the disappointing outcome of the COP-15 in Copenhagen,
thus reducing the firms’ incentive to invest in different production technologies and costly
renewable energies. In other words, credible goals are probably necessary if we are to achieve
“incredible” (that is, unexpectedly good) results in the emission reductions in the next few years.
This does not imply that policy makers should lower their long-run targets since they appear
too ambitious with respect to the results pursued so far, but they should set feasible and binding
intermediate targets that are then to be reached in order to avoid time consistency problems. If not,
the tendency to announce ever stricter environmental policies for the years to come while failing to
21
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achieve the intermediate targets may undermine the credibility of the future energy policies and thus
also the capacity to implement them.
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Distance from the Kyoto targets (%) of the EU-15 member
countries in 2008
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Figure 1: distance in 2008 of the EU-15 from the Kyoto targets (reported on the horizontal axis).
Source: author's elaboration on the European Environment Agency (2010a) dataset.

Figure 2: price volatility of the EU carbon permits
Source: www.pointcarbon.com
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Figure 3: Share of biofuels in fuel consumption in the EU-27 member countries in 2007 as
compared to the 2010 and 2020 targets.
Source: European Environment Agency (2009)
URL: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/share-of-biofuels-in-fuel-consumption-fortransport-in-eu27-in-2007-compared-to-2010-and-2020-targets
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